He has vowed to combat poverty and corruption, to construct four million new homes in four years, and to build "a government of the people for a strong Iran". A member of Iran's Turkish-speaking minority, he has campaigned for central bank independence and less "state interference" in the economy. He has also advocated an "active diplomacy with East and West" for the sake of economic development.
After having worked in Khamenei's office, the year-old ultraconservative was in charge of negotiations with world powers on Iran's nuclear programme between and as secretary of the Supreme National Security Council. Jalili advocates stronger economic relations with neighbouring countries, rather than waiting for assistance from the West, and closer ties with states "following the same line" as Iran. Iran extends voting in presidential poll defined by voter apathy.
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Breaking down the presidential race in Iran. From an early age, Mr Raisi held powerful and high-ranking positions - when he was just 20 years old, he was already serving as the chief prosecutor of the city of Karaj. He was appointed head of the judiciary in , two years after he lost by a landslide to Hassan Rouhani in the last presidential election. Mr Raisi has presented himself as the best person to fight corruption and inequality, and solve Iran's economic problems.
The man who wears a black turban identifying him in Shia tradition as a descendant of the Prophet Muhammad is fiercely loyal to Iran's ruling clerics, and has even been seen as a possible successor to Ayatollah Khamenei.
But many Iranians and rights groups have pointed to Mr Raisi's alleged role in the mass executions of political prisoners in , when he was 27 years old.
He is said to have been part of a so-called "death committee" - one of four judges who oversaw secret death sentences for about 5, prisoners in jails near Tehran, according to Amnesty International.
It says the location of the mass graves where the men and women were buried is being "systematically concealed by the Iranian authorities". Mr Raisi has repeatedly denied his role in the death sentences. But he has also said they were justified because of a fatwa, or religious ruling, by former supreme leader Ayatollah Khomeini. Amnesty also says that as head of the judiciary Mr Raisi oversaw impunity for officials and security forces accused of killing protesters during unrest in Mr Raisi has promised to ease unemployment and work to remove US sanctions that have contributed to economic hardship for ordinary Iranians and caused widespread discontent.
BBC Persian correspondent Kasra Naji adds that under Mr Raisi, Iran's hardliners will seek to reinforce a puritanical system of Islamic government, possibly meaning more controls on social activities, fewer freedoms and jobs for women, and tighter control of social media and the press. The hardliners are suspicious of the West, but both Mr Raisi and Supreme Leader Khamenei favour a return to an international deal on Iran's nuclear activity.
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, signed in , gave Iran relief from Western sanctions in return for limiting its nuclear activities. The US pulled out of the deal in , and President Trump's administration re-imposed crippling limits on Iran's ability to trade. Even though the conservatives now control most of the elective and non-elective government institutions, this does not mean that the intra-elite power struggle will disappear.
However, it might facilitate agreements in particular domestic and foreign policy decisions in the coming four years. His background and education are mainly those of a religious jurist, mostly at Qom seminaries. Although he is usually known as an ayatollah , his clerical credentials are contested by many, who claim that he should be considered only as hojat-ol-eslam.
He was included in the US Executive Order of 24 June , which designated Iranian government officials who prevented free and fair elections. He could be investigated due to his alleged participation in the mass executions of , according to the UN Humans Rights Rapporteur Javaid Rehman.
Even though the Leadership is the most powerful position in Iran, the occupant of the Presidency has a certain significance and, at least since , a relatively high impact on foreign policy. Instead, it has always been a factionalised system since the establishment of the Islamic Republic in Many references were made to the hojjatieh and maktabi 1 in the s when the ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini was still alive.
The same occurred after his death in , with the coexistence of different political factions: pragmatists, traditional conservatives, reformists and radical conservatives. The factions have always been involved in the struggle for power, affecting not only domestic policies but also foreign policy-making and outputs.
The Iranian political system is also very dynamic, and politicians and groups have been moving within the limits of the Islamic Revolutionary ideology between conservatism and reformism over the past four decades. This happened with Hashemi Rafsanjani, Mir Hussein Mousavi, Mehdi Karrubi, Hassan Rouhani, Ali Larijani, Ali Motahhari and others that were considered radicals in the s and s, but eventually became reformists, pragmatists or moderate conservatives.
Without the protection provided by Rafsanjani, who died in , with Khatami politically banned, Mousavi and Karrubi in house arrest since , Rouhani and Zarif relatively discredited, and no other emerging political figure attracting popular support, the chances of recovering a share in the elective arena in the short term seem very slim. However, this does not mean that the political system is now unified, monolithic and that there will be no discrepancies.
During this last electoral process it was already possible to discern some discrepancies that cannot be considered misleading but a tangible demonstration that the factional disputes between reformists, pragmatists and conservatives will now be transferred to the inner conservative circles. First, two days before the release of the official list of candidates by the Guardian Council, Fars News, affiliated with the IRGC also known as Sepah-e Pasdaran , leaked the list of approved candidates a couple of days before the official release on 26 May.
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